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 1. Introduction.  
 
The economics literature has paid attention to the analysis of policy combinations in the climate and 
energy policy realms. Following the well-known principle in economics that a single market failure is 
best addressed with one instrument, while multiple market failures require multiple instruments 
(Tinbergen 1952, del Río 2009, Fischer and Preonas 2010), the literature generally argues that we need 
to combine several instruments. The scope of such combinations clearly depends on the externalities 
to be addressed and, in short, on the technical maturity and commercial competitiveness of the energy 
technologies in general and renewable energy technologies (RETs) in particular. For example, while 
R&D support is critical in the first stages of the innovation process (basic and applied R&D), its 
relevance comparatively diminishes as we advance to the pre-commercial stages. It becomes relatively 
unimportant for fully commercial technologies characterised by a dominant design. In contrast, a 
carbon price is useful to internalize the negative environmental externality, which is the most relevant 
in the last stages of the innovation process. 
Deployment support has generally been justified for intermediate stages. Although there is a wide 
agreement that combinations may be needed to tackle the market failures, it has also been shown that 
them could lead to conflicts, resulting in inefficiencies, redundancies, double coverage or double 
counting (Sorrel and Sijm 2003, del Río 2007). This empirical finding has led many to be sceptical 
about instrument combinations. This paper focuses on the interaction mechanism of instrument 
combinations to support the deployment of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E), 
analysing whether such combination is either redundant or cost-effective with respect to the use of a 
single instrument. 
There are several RES-E deployment instruments, which generally fall in two groups: primary 
instruments (feed-in tariffs (FITs), feed-in premiums (FIPs), quotas with tradable green certificates 
(TGCs) and tendering schemes) and secondary instruments (investment subsidies, fiscal incentives and 
soft loans, among others) (see section 2). However, the abundant literature comparing the primary 
instruments between them (see, among others, Ragwitz et al 2007, del Rio and Gual 2004 and Finon 
and Perez 2007) contrasts with the scarce research on their detailed interactions. 
Virtually no attention has been paid to the combination of deployment instruments for the same 
technology, not even in recent, highly influential policy documents such as the policy chapter in the 
IPPC Report on Climate Change and Renewables (Mitchell et al 2011) and the IEA Report on Policies 
for Renewables (Müller et al 2011)1. This neglect is all the more striking given the existence of 
combinations of deployment instruments either for the same technology or across technologies in the 
real world (REN21 2005 and 2009). What RES-E support policies to use and, therefore, how to 
combine them in order to promote the deployment of RES-E cost-effectively is a relevant issue for 
governments, at least in the EU, where ambitious targets for the penetration of renewable energy in 
energy consumption have been set for 2020 (Directive 28/2009/EC). 
 Therefore, the question remains whether combining primary and secondary deployment 
instruments leads to better results in terms of cost-effectiveness compared to their separate use, i.e., 
whether the same amount of RES-E can be deployed at a lower costs for consumers. We try to 
contribute to the extremely thin literature on the topic with the help of a financial model. The aim of 
this paper is twofold. First, we test how FITs and FIPs are modified if combined with investment 
subsidies or soft loans. The second, related aim is to test whether a combination of these primary and 
secondary deployment instruments leads to lower support costs compared to the use of FITs or FIPSs 
alone (for the same amount of RES-E deployment). 
Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a description of RES-E 
support schemes and identifies combinations of those deployment instruments, with a focus on the 
European context. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the relationship between FITs and FIPs, and investment 
subsidies and soft loans when the net benefit for the investor is constant (section 3) and when the net 
benefit and the discount rate are reduced (section 4). The support costs of policy combinations are 
analysed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                     
1
 Indeed, Mitchell et al (2011) note that further research is also needed to fully understand the effectiveness and 
efficiency of combinations of policy instruments designed to achieve a very high share of RES-E in the long 
term. 
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2. Primary and secondary RES-E support schemes and their combinations.  
 
RES-E deployment promotion has traditionally been based on four main (primary) support measures, 
whose costs are usually borne by consumers: FITs, FIPs, quotas with TGCs and tendering (see del Río 
and Gual 2004, Huber et al 2004, Ragwitz et al 2007, Ragwitz et al 2012, Teckenbourg et al 2011, 
Klessmann and Lovinfosse, 2012, and IEA/IRENA 2013 for further details). 
• Feed-in laws are preferential prices per kWh (or MWh) generated, which are combined with a 
purchase obligation by the utilities. The most relevant distinction is between feed-in tariffs 
(FITs) and premium systems (FIPs). The former provides total payments per kWh of 
electricity of renewable origin while, in the later case, a payment per kWh on top of the 
electricity wholesale-market price is granted (Sijm 2005). Both types are applied in 19 EU 
countries. 
• TGCs are certificates that can be sold in the market, allowing RES-E generators to obtain 
revenue. This is additional to the revenue from their sales of electricity fed into the grid. 
Therefore, RES-E generators benefit from two streams of revenue from two different markets: 
the market price of electricity plus the market price of TGCs multiplied by the number of 
MWh of renewable electricity fed into the grid. The issuing (supply) of TGCs takes place for 
every MWh of RES-E, while demand generally originates from an obligation. Electricity 
distribution companies must surrender a number of TGCs as a share of their annual 
consumption or pay a penalty. The TGC price covers the gap between the marginal cost of 
renewable electricity generation at the quota level and the price of electricity. Quotas with 
TGCs are used in 6 EU countries (U.K., Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Romania and Poland), with 
two of them partially using FITs (Italy and U.K.). 
• Tendering. The government invites RES-E generators to compete for either a certain financial 
budget or a certain RES-E generation capacity. Within each technology band the cheapest bids 
per kWh are awarded contracts and receive the subsidy. The operator pays the bid price per 
kWh. In the EU, tendering is currently used in Lithuania and in the Netherlands, UK and 
Denmark for off-shore wind. In the past, it was also used in Ireland (AER)(1995-2003), U.K. 
(NFFO)(1990-1998), France (EOLE 1996) (PPI, 1996-2004 for wind, 2000-2007 for 
biomass), Latvia (2006-2009) and Portugal (2005-2008). It was implemented in Italy in 2013. 
In addition to these primary instruments, there are several secondary instruments which have been 
combined with the former in the past: 
• Investment subsidies. They are granted in the beginning of the project lifetime and can be 
calculated as a percentage of the renewable energy output or the specific investment cost, 
although this latter version is more common. Investments grants for RES-E are available in 
several Member States. Investment subsidies are applied for most renewable energy 
technologies in the Czech Republic, Finland, Cyprus, Greece, the Netherlands, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Latvia. They are applied in Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands 
for solar PV. 
• Fiscal incentives can be exemptions or rebates on (energy, corporate or income) taxes, tax 
refunds, lower VAT rates or attractive depreciation schemes. Some countries, including Spain, 
the Netherlands, Finland and Greece provide tax incentives related to investments (including 
income tax deductions or credits for some fraction of the capital investment made in 
renewable energy projects, or accelerated depreciation). Other Member States, including 
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK, provide income tax deductions or credits at a 
set rate per unit of RES-E (de Jager et al 2011). 
• Soft loans are usually provided by governments with a rate below the market interest rate. In 
some cases, they can significantly reduce the costs of capital. Soft loans may also provide 
longer repayment periods or interest holidays. Soft-loans are available in Bulgaria, Germany, 
Estonia, Malta, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands (except for 
offshore wind) and Slovenia. 
Combinations of FITs and FIPs with either investment subsidies or soft loans (the focus of this 
paper), for the same technologies, have been implemented in several countries, according to BMU 
3
 (2011) and Wrinkel et al (2011)2. For example, FITs are used jointly with investment subsidies in 
Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark (for small installations), Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania (only for rooftop solar PV and for RES-E used in enterprises), Luxembourg (for the 
installation of solar systems in private households and RES-E investments in companies), Malta (only 
for small solar installations), Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The combination of FITs and soft loans seems to be more common in the renewable heating than in 
the renewable electricity sector (see Wrinkler et al 2011). FITs and soft loans have jointly been used to 
support RES-E in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, the 
Netherlands (not for offshore wind) and Slovenia. 
With respect FIPs, they are combined with investment subsidies in Estonia, Finland and Slovakia 
and Slovenia, and with soft loans in the Netherlands. 
While FITs and FIPs provide a stable revenue flow for investors, and have proven very effective at 
triggering RES-E investments, investment subsidies and soft loans may further encourage investments 
by reducing the costs of financing3. From the point of view of the payer, the value of the grant or the 
loan is known and does not create, at least in principle, any future liabilities. They may be particularly 
suitable for immature and higher risks technologies such as wind offshore or CSP compared to more 
mature technologies4. They are also relatively easy to administer, especially if an administration used 
to handle subsidy schemes is already operational5. However, from the point of view of the recipient, 
one of the well-known weaknesses of investment subsidies is their stop-and-go: they usually depend 
directly on the public budget and, therefore, alter with a changing political agenda (IEA 2011, Mitchell 
et al 2011). 
 
3. The mechanism of instrument combinations. 
 
A financial model has been built in three steps in order to provide an economic analysis of the 
combinations of FITs and FIPs with investment subsidies and soft loans. In the first step, the well-
known expression of the net present value (V) of an investment project has been adapted to the 
specificities of the mix of deployment instruments. The expression of the V of a RES-E installation 
can be written as: 
 = 1 + 	
1 + 	




 −  +
1 + 	
1 + 	




 																										[1] 
where, 
qACt  annual plant production (kWh or MWh) 
I
 
upfront investments which includes the costs of the main equipments (i.e., turbines or 
PV panels) and their transportation to the site and installation, as well as the grid 
connection (cables, substation), civil works (foundations, roads, buildings) and many 
other costs (engineering, licensing, permitting, environmental assessments, 
consultancy, structuring finance and so on) (Wiser et al 2011, de Jager et al 2011) 
t  time (a year), t∈[1, T] 
T  installation lifetime 
p  initial FIT level 
m initial O&M costs, expected expenditures for fuel (only for biomass), insurance, taxes, 
fees for energy commercialization and forecasting services. 
                                                     
2
 Investment subsidies and soft loans have also been combined with TGC schemes. This has been the case for 
investment subsidies in Flanders, Romania and Sweden (for solar PV and wind). Low-interest loans for  
renewable electricity generation are combined with a TGC scheme in Poland. 
3
 They have a favourable impact on the debt/equity structure under the same debt service requirements (de Jager 
et al 2011). 
4
 These latter have lower difficulties in finding loans since their risks are lower given that a great amount of 
experience already exists. 
5
 But while a grant may help get a facility built without post-installation follow up, it does not ensure that a 
project will operate. Grants generally require oversight to ensure that certain preconditions are met, that the 
quality of new generating capacity meets at least a minimum standard, and that effective operation of installed 
systems is achieved. This implies additional administrative costs (Connor et al., 2009). 
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 i   interest rate (or discount rate)  
ε  annual rate of tariff revision.  
µ  annual rate of O&M costs increase. 
All terms are defined in relation to the capacity of the plant (kW). 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that: 
1. The upfront investment is paid cash, except otherwise stated. 
2. The discount rate (i) is greater than the tariff revision rate (ε) and the annual rate of O&M 
costs increase (µ), that is, i>ε=µ.    
3. Annual production is constant:  =  . 
4. The initial O&M cost (m) is set as a proportion of the amount of investment: m=τI, 0<τ<1. 
5. Taxes are not included. 
6. The installation has no residual value. 
Some remarks should be made with respect to assumption 2. On the one hand, the assumption µ=ε 
is easy to accept. Indeed, wages are an important part of O&M costs. Moreover, wages are annually 
revised according to the Consumer Price Index which is also the reference value used by several 
countries to update the FITs for the operating plants. Therefore, we assume that the dynamics of O&M 
costs and the rate of tariff updating overlap. On the other hand, the discount rate depends on the real 
interest rate of short-term public debt (i.e., the minimum interest rate), the inflation rate and the risk 
premium. It reflects the gross profitability expected by the investors. In this sense, it is associated to 
the cost of capital, i.e., the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC).6 The WACC could be 
understood as the required rate at which a prospective investor is prone to invest in a new plant (de 
Jager et al, 2011). For the purposes of our model, it is enough to assume that i will be greater than ε. 
Starting from [1], the next step is to define the profitability index of the project, also called the 
profit investment ratio (r),  =  															[2] 
Given the assumptions and rearranging the terms, we obtain the following equation, 
 =  −  !1 + 1 + "

 − 1

 													[3] 
The finite series of this expression can be aggregated as follows, 
!1+ 1 + "

$
$ =
1 +  −  %1 − !1 + 1 + "
& 
A positive number results because i>ε (or i=α·ε, α>1) and the last term is lower than 1. If this sum 
is denoted by K, [2] can finally be rewritten as  = '  −  − 1																		[4] 
r allows us to quantify the present value of the net cash-flows with respect the upfront investments. 
The profitability index is commonly used for ranking investment projects which have a given 
expectation of revenues and outlays. The higher the profit investment ratio, the more desirable is the 
investment.7 
All these expressions have been defined considering FITs. However, the kWh could be remunerated 
according to the wholesale electricity market price plus a premium, that is, by feed-in premium (FIP). 
It is not difficult to include FIP in such financial model. The general expression of FIP is given by, )
 = *
 + +
	 
                                                     
6
 As it is known, this criterion determines the required rate of return on a project. It combines the expected 
returns of equity holders (using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)), with the requirement of lenders and 
reflects the investor’s systematic and non-diversifiable risk. In the case of RES-E investments supported by FITs, 
two kinds of risks are considered: uncertainty on future electricity generation due to unexpected production 
breaks, technical problems, etc., which can cause additional O&M expenditures, and regulatory risk, i.e., the 
reductions of future revenues caused by changes in the support scheme. 
7
 The model has not been designed to deal with other types of profitability indicators, such as the return on 
invested capital or the return on equity. 
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 where, 
ρt
 
 guaranteed price for feeding-in (per kWh or MWh) 
et electricity wholesale market price 
σt premium 
As expected, ρt≤pt being pt the FIT when RES-E generation costs are well above the retail and 
wholesale electricity prices. 
In the expression of the net present value with FITs, we have considered the initial remuneration 
level (tariff) and its annual updating. In the case of remuneration through a premium, there is not such 
an updating of the support level. This requires that additional assumptions are made. The premium is 
added to the wholesale price of electricity. This premium may be set as a fixed amount, a percentage 
of such wholesale price or a changing quantity. This sliding premium fluctuates according to the pool 
price, with a floor payment and a cap payment. In order to simplify, we assume that investors analyze 
the past dynamics of the pool price and the associated premiums and that they interpolate these values 
into the future in order to calculate plausible profitability levels for their projects. Thus, we assume 
constant values for e and σ. If these assumptions were not made, the mathematical formulation would 
be complicated, although nothing substantial would be modified. 
According to expressions [1] and [2], including ρ and taking into account the assumptions and 
rearranging the terms, we obtain 
 = %* + +	 & 11 + 	




 − !
1 + ,1 + "




 + 1	 
The result of the first finite sum, 
 11 + 	
 = 1 + 	 − 11 + 	


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will be denoted by Z. 
Therefore, 
 = * + +	 - − ' + 1									[5] 
The third step is to appropriately modify expression [1] in order to include the different 
combinations of deployment instruments (investment subsidies and soft loans). Using these 
expressions, two main aspects will be studied: 
1. How a given change in the level of investment subsidies or soft loans modifies the tariffs.  
2. The cost of the policy combinations for consumers and/or the public budget with respect to the 
alternative (i.e., no instrument combinations). 
 
 
3.1. Tariffs and premiums and investment subsidies. 
 
Let I be the upfront investments of a given RES-E project. This amount is divided in two parts: 
I= γI+(1-γ)I, 0<γ≤1 
The term γI represents the amount of the investment subsidy and (1−γ)I refers to the portion of the 
initial outlays which are financed by the promoters' own funds. Therefore, equation [1] can be 
rewritten as follows, 
 = !1 + 1 + "

 + / − / + 1 − /	 + !1 + 1 + "




 



  
Promoters pay the upfront investments and, by assumption, the subsidy (γI) is granted before the 
plant operation begins. Rearranging the elements, 
 =  − 	!1 + 1 + "




 − 1 − /																	[6] 
As it was established, the sum of the finite series is denoted by K. Therefore, this equation can be 
rewritten as,   = ' + / − ' − 1	 
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 According to the aforementioned definition of the profitability index, 
 =  = ' + / − ' − 1	  
To obtain the relationship between p and γ (i.e., the p=f(γ) function), we set r=r*. Then, 
 = ∗ + 1 + '	' − ' /																				[7] 
This is a decreasing straight line. Indeed, differentiating it with respect to γ, leads to 33/ = − ' 
which is a negative value. 
In case of the combination of FIP and investment subsidies from the appropriate version of equation 
[1] it is obtained,  = * + +	- + / − [/ + 1 − /	 + '] 
Therefore, according to the aforementioned definition of the profitability index, 
 =  = * + +	- + / − ' − 1	  
To obtain the relationship between the premium (σ) and γ (i.e., the σ=f(γ) function), we set r=r*. 
Then, 
+ = ∗ + 1 + '	- − * − - /																					[8] 
This is a decreasing straight line. Indeed, differentiating it with respect to γ, leads to 3+3/ = − - 
which is also a negative value. Moreover, from expression [8], the higher the pool price, the closer 
is the function σ=f(γ) to the origin. Therefore, the same level of subsidies can be combined with lower 
premium levels. 
The main differences between [7] and [8] are the wholesale market price (e) and the factor Z in the 
denominator. The figure 1 illustrates the p=f(γ) and σ=f(γ) relationships. The data set refers to a 
photovoltaic plant, where: I=3,500 €/kW; T=30 years; q=1,800 kWh/kW; i=0.06; ε=0.02; r*=0.04, 
τ=0.01 and e=0.05 €/kWh. In case of FIT the maximum value of the tariff is pm=0.135 €/kWh and the 
minimum is pn=0.024 €/kWh. This minimum value covers the O&M costs and ensures that the 
established net rate of return is achieved. In case of FIP, the maximum premium is σm=0.122 €/kWh 
and the minimum is σn=0 €/kWh, that is, when the project is subsidized up to the 86% of the upfront 
investment. 
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Figure 1. Tariffs (FIT) and premiums (FIP), and investment subsidies 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
As it can be observed in the figure, the different values of the premium associated to a given 
subsidy level are below the remuneration level with tariffs. The reason is that the amount of the 
premium is, by definition, lower than the hypothetical reference tariff, given that RES-E generators 
receive the whole electricity price on top of the premium. Therefore, the direct financial burden on 
consumers is lower. If subsidies are added to the premium, for a given profitability level, there is a 
value of γ'
 
for which σ=0, that is, /5 = ∗ + 1 + ' − *-  
Above such subsidy rate, the addition of the wholesale price and the premium would lead to an 
excessive remuneration of the projects. To avoid this, the premium has to be removed. 
 
3.2. Tariffs and premiums, and soft loans 
 
Let I be the amount of upfront investments which can be disaggregated in two parts: 
I=λI+(1-λ)I, 0<λ≤1 
The term λI refers to the portion of the investment which is financed by a soft loan and (1−λ)I 
represents the part paid in cash by the investors. As a rule, shareholders get access to advantageous 
debt conditions only if they finance the remaining investment from their own funds. Hence, it could be 
assumed that investors do not finance any portion of the investment through commercial loans. Then, 
the appropriate expression of the net present value in order to calculate the relationship between tariffs 
and soft loans is: 
 = 1 + 	
1 + 	
 − 61 − 7	 +1 + 	
1 + 	
 +



 
781 + 	
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For the sake of simplicity, the following specific assumptions are added: 
1. The amortisation period is the same as the lifetime of the installation (T). 
2. Amortisation consists of constant payoffs.8 The debt service (payoffs plus interests) in the t-th 
period is: 
                                                     
8
 A constant payoffs amortisation schedule has been chosen instead of a constant annuities one, because of the 
mathematical complexity of the later (see Luderer et al 2002, p.39). 
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where λI represents the amount of the soft loan (i*=ϕi, 0≤ϕ<1), 
Expression [9] can then be rewritten as follows, 
 = 1 + 	
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Then, 
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that is, 
(pq-τI)K 
If we consider the factors associated to the loan amortisation, i.e., 
7 18 11 + 	
 + 7> !1 − 9 − 18 " 11 + 	
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whereas the first finite sum has been denoted by Z, the second one can be written as, 1 + 	@A8 − 1A8 + 1  
If this result is denoted by W, then expression [10] becomes,9 7- 18 + 7B> 
Therefore, equation [9] can be transformed into,  =  − 	' − 1 − 7	 − 7- 8 − 7B>															[11] 
Then, the relationship between p, λ and ϕ, after setting up r=r*, can be written as follows: 
 =  C1 − 7	 + ' + ∗ + 7- 18 + 7B>D' 																				[12] 
Equation [12] has two degrees of freedom (λ and ϕ). For that reason, it can be analysed from two 
different perspectives: 
1. The impact of λ on p, i.e., how changes in the share of the upfront investments which can be 
paid by a soft loan (a percentage established by law), affect the tariff. 
2. The impact of a reduction of the interest rate (0≤ϕ<1) on tariffs, given a specific λ∗. 
From [12], the p=f(λ) function can be written as follows, 
 = 1 + ' + ∗	' +  B>
∗ + - 18 − 1 ' 7													[13] 
and p=f(ϕ), 
 =  C1 − 7∗	 + ' + ∗ + 7∗- 18D' + 7∗B' >									[14] 
To start with the case of FIP combined with soft loans, the expression of the net present value now 
is, 
 = * + +	1 + 	
 − 61 − 7	 +1 + 	
1 + 	
 +



 
781 + 	
 +7 1 −
9 − 18  ∗1 + 	








 :					[15]	



  
This expression can be rewritten as follows, 
                                                     
9
 K>Z because the numerator (1+ε) in K is greater than 1, that is, when ε>0. However, Z=K if ε=0.  
9
  = * + +	- − ' − 1 − 7	 − 7- 8 − 7B> 
Therefore, the relationship between σ, λ and ϕ, after setting up r=r*, can be written as follows: 
+ =  C1 − 7	 + ' + ∗ + 7- 18 + 7B>D- − *											[16] 
Analogously to the FIT case, this equation has also two degrees of freedom (λ and ϕ). The σ=f(λ) 
function is, 
+ = 1 + ' + ∗	- − * +  B>
∗ + - 18 − 1 - 7										[17] 
and σ=f(ϕ), 
+ =  C1 − 7∗	 + ' + ∗ + 7∗- 18D- − * + 7∗B- >										[18] 
Figure 2 illustrates the p=f(λ) and σ=f(λ) functions10. As expected, the value of tariffs and 
premiums decrease when λ increases towards its maximum value (λ=1), that is, to the situation in 
which the whole upfront investment is financed by a soft loan. In case of FIT the maximum value of 
the tariff is pm=0.135 €/kWh and the minimum is pn=0.105 €/kWh. In case of FIP, the maximum 
premium is σm=0.122 €/kWh and the minimum is σn=0.083 €/kWh, 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between premiums and λ 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 3 shows a hypothetical relationship between the tariff (p) and premium (σ) and the 
percentage of the upfront investment which is financed by a soft loan (ϕ), given λ∗. It has been built 
considering the usual data set, with λ∗=0.75. As expected, the values of p and σ decrease with 
reductions in ϕ. 
 
                                                     
10
 As before, the data set is referred to a photovoltaic plant, with I=3,500 €/kW; T=30 years; q=1,800 kWh/kW; 
i=0.06; ε=0.02; r* =0.04; ϕ∗=0.5; τ=0.01, and e=0.05 €/kWh.. 
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Figure 3. The relationship between premiums and soft loans. 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In case of FIT the maximum value of the tariff is pm=0.135 €/kWh and the minimum is pn=0.09 
€/kWh. In case of FIP, σm=0.122 €/kWh and σn=0.064 €/kWh. 
As it was the case under the combination of FIP and subsidies, the required level of the premium in 
order to reach a certain level of profitability are also lower than the level under a tariff scheme. The 
increase in the pool price also leads to more favorable situations. 
The general relationship between the three variables in case of FIT and FIP is shown in figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The p=f(λ, ϕ) and σ=f(λ, ϕ) surfaces 
Source: Own elaboration 
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 On the one hand, in the representation of the p=f(λ, ϕ) function, pm and pn refer respectively to the 
maximum and the minimum values of p. Analogously, in the case of the σ=f(λ, ϕ) function, σ m and 
σ n refer respectively to the maximum and the minimum values of σ. The distance between the pm and 
σm points (both in position λ=0, ϕ=0) is smaller than pn and σn (both in position λ=1, ϕ=0) because in 
expressions [14] and [18], Z·1/T<1. 
On the other hand, if λ=0, then investors only have access to loans at commercial interest rates. 
Similarly, if ϕ=1, then there is no interest rate reduction. Of course, both situations overlap if λ=ϕ=1. 
In this case, p=f(λ, ϕ) and σ=f(λ, ϕ) are a constant functions whose value are respectively the 
maximum p and σ .
 
 
 
4. Changing the level of profitability and the discount rate 
 
Coming back to equations [4] and [5], the relationship between p and r, and σ and r, can be expressed 
as follows, 
 
 = ' + 1	' + ' 														[19] 
 
+ = ' + 1	- + -  − *						[20] 
 
which are increasing straight lines. Tariffs and premiums move in the same direction as the net 
profitability index (r). From the above data set, the following (r, p) pairs are obtained: (0%, 0.1308), 
(10%, 0.1419), (20%, 0.1531) and (30%, 0.1642). With respect (r, σ) pairs we have (0%, 0.116), 
(10%, 0.13), (20%, 0.144) and (30%, 0.158). Thus, as shown by expressions [7]/[8] and [11]/[16], the 
p=f(γ), and σ=f(γ), functions and the surfaces  p=f(λ, ϕ) and σ=f(λ, ϕ) will move in parallel up (down) 
to the increase (decrease) of r. For this reason, the higher the level of net profitability, the greater 
should be the proportion of the investment subsidy for a given level of tariffs or premiums. 
The case of the discount rate is different because this term is included in the K and Z factors. From 
a financial point of view, the discount rate reveals the perceived risk of an investment project: its value 
and the alleged risk move in the same direction. Therefore, if i increases, K and Z decrease (towards an 
asymptotic value), since the denominator (1+i)t increases. Figure 5 shows the relationship between K 
and i for three levels of the inflation rate (ε3>ε2>ε1). The higher the discount rate with respect to a 
given ε, the lower is K. 
If the discount rate in the net present value expression is higher, investment subsidies partially lose 
their capability to reduce tariffs and premiums.  
When FITs, or FIPs, and soft loans are combined, the additional effect induced by the following 
factors should be taken into account in order to assess the impact of the discount rate: 7- 18 + 7B>										[21] 
It is not difficult to prove that Z≥W because the values of the factor 1 − 
@  
 
range from 1 (when 
t=1) to 1/T (t=T), i.e., they are positive and below or equal to 1. 
The terms Z and W are multiplied by different variables whose observed values are closer to 0. 
Therefore, the sum in [21] and the value of τ represent very small numbers. As a result, a higher 
discount rate has a greater impact on the denominator, in which there is K or Z, than on the numerator. 
The p=f(λ, ϕ) and σ=f(λ, ϕ) surfaces, i.e., the tariffs and premiums move up because of greater 
discount rate. 
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Figure 5. The relationship between K and the discount rate (i) for different levels of the inflation rate (ε). 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
5. The financial costs of instrument combinations. 
 
Next, we compare the financial cost of combining FITs and FIPs and investment subsidies, or soft 
loans, with respect to a remuneration without such advantages. The analysis in this section is carried 
out for a representative RES-E plant, based on the models developed in section 3. These models only 
consider the stylised facts, so it should not be regarded as a comprehensive analysis of the global 
dynamics of such a policy. Obviously, an analysis of the total costs would require building up very 
complex models encompassing variables such as the time profile of new capacity entering into the 
generation mix, the tariff degression rate and the legal duration of support.  
The overall cost of the support policy per installation (CS) is defined as the net present value of the 
tariffs received during the lifetime of this installation plus the initial investment subsidy, i.e.,  
EF/	 = /	 1 +  −  %1 − !1 + 1 + "
& + / = /	' + /												[22] 
where γ is the proportion of the subsidised investment (0<γ ≤1) and p(γ) represents its associated 
tariff. In case of FIPs the expression to be considered is,  
EFG$H/	 = +/	 1 + 	 − 11 + 	 + / = +/	- + /												[23] 
Because both change according to the restriction r=r*, the values of CS and CfipS are constant. 
Furthermore, [22] and [23] have a y=a+bx functional form. The starting point of these straight lines are 
the no investment subsidy case (γ=0). So, if both values are compared, 
CS(γ)-CS(0)= p(γ)qK+γ I -p(0)qK=γ I,  0<γ≤1 
and, 
CfipS(γ)-CfipS(0)= σ(γ)qZ+γ I -σ(0)qZ=γ I,  0<γ≤1 
With the aforementioned dataset, the value of CS(γ) is €4,251.027 and CfipS (γ) is €3,012.192. 
Therefore, given the level of net profitability (r*), the different combinations of tariffs, or premiums, 
and investment subsidies do not change the financial costs of the policy. However, there is a 
redistribution of the same amount of support between FITs, or FIPs, and investment subsidies. 
Subsidies could probably give rise to massive financial requirements at the beginning of such a policy, 
which is problematic at a time of high public budgets restrictions. Furthermore, the comparatively 
small amount of future tariffs does not mitigate this problem. But there is not an efficiency conflict 
between higher short-term costs and lower inter-temporal costs because the overall costs do not 
change: there is simply a different temporal distribution of financial resources. 
13
 Similarly to the case of investment subsidies, we analyse the cost of the combination of a FITs with 
soft loans for a representative installation. The expression of overall policy costs is, 
EI7, >	 = 7, >	1 + 	
1 + 	
 + 1 − >	71 −
9 − 18  1 + 	
 ,			with	0 < 7 ≤ 1	and	0 ≤ > < 1
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and with respect FIPs, 
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Both expressions represents the sum of the tariffs, or premiums, being paid plus the volume of 
interests being avoided by a representative plant over its lifetime. Obviously, these expressions change 
according to the values of λ  and ϕ. These values modify the tariff and premiums provided that r=r*. 
Analogously to the subsidies case, the strong connection between p, or σ, and λ an ϕ explains why CS 
(λ, ϕ) and CfipS (λ, ϕ) are constant values (actually the same before indicated). The net present value of 
the amount paid to a plant which benefits from tariffs, or premiums, and soft loans does not change no 
matter the proportion of the investment being financed by preferential loans and the degree of 
reduction of the interest rate. There is also an internal redistribution of financial resources in the 
tariffs, or premiums, and soft loans combination. 
 
6. Main conclusions. 
 
In this paper, we have assessed the relationship between the support costs of combinations of 
deployment instruments for a given technology, compared to a situation when only one instrument 
(FITs or FIPs) is used. It has been found out that the policy costs of instrument combinations are the 
same as for the FITs or FIPs-only options, provided that the rate of net profitability and the discount 
rate do not change. The different levels of investment subsidies or soft-loans merely involve inter-
temporal distributions of the same amount of policy costs. However, such inter-temporal distributions 
affect the social acceptability and political feasibility of renewable energy support. In particular, 
combining investment subsidies with FITs (or FIPs) involve greater policy costs in the short term 
compared with the FITs or FIPs-only option. This would be less socially acceptable and politically 
feasible. Combining FITs and FIPs with subsidies could be regarded by policy-makers as less 
attractive (and, thus, less politically feasible) than the FITs or FIPs-only option, which leads to a more 
uniform distribution of the costs of the policy over time. 
Combining deployment measures is not a cost-containment strategy. Increasing the cost-
effectiveness of support is an important topic at a time when governments, at least in Europe, are 
concerned about the increasing costs of RES-E support, mostly related (although not only) to solar PV 
support. This has been the case in Spain, Czech Republic, Italy, France or Germany, among others 
(Mitchell et al 2011, Müller et al 2011, European Commission, 2013). 
Conversely, if the aim is to reduce this financial burden, the only way to do so is to induce lower 
values of the discount and the net profitability rates (assuming that basic technical and economical 
variables such as I, q and T, do not change). Public policy can contribute to reduce those policy costs 
by reducing the regulatory risks for investors, by adapting the level of support to technology costs and 
by controlling the increase in RES-E generation11. The former affects the discount rate, the two later 
influence the net profitability rate.  
 
References.  
 
BMU (German Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety) 2011. Legal 
sources on renewable energy. Available at <http://www.res-legal.de/en/search-for-support-
scheme.html>. Accessed August 20, 2011 
                                                     
11
 There are some cost-containment mechanisms that can be applied in FITs, including generation caps, capacity 
caps and flexible degression. See del Río (2012) for further details. 
14
 Connor, P. et al. 2009. Overview of RESH/RES-C Support Options. The RES-H Policy project. 
University of Exeter, Exeter, UK. Document available at <www.res-h-policy.eu/downloads/RES-
H_Policy-Options_(D4)_final.pdf>. 
de Jager, D. et al. 2011. Financing Renewable Energy in the European Energy Market. Final Report. 
Ecofys. Utrecht. 
del Río, P. 2007. The interaction between emissions trading and renewable electricity support 
schemes. An overview of the literature. Mitigation Adaptation Strategies Global Change 12(8), 
1363-1390. 
del Río, P. 2009. Interactions between climate and energy policies: the case of Spain. Climate Policy 9 
(2), 119-138. 
del Río, P. 2012. The dynamic efficiency of feed-in tariffs: the impact of different design elements. 
Energy Policy, 41 (2), 139-151. 
del Río, P. Gual, M.A. 2004. The Promotion of Green Electricity in Europe: Present and Future. 
European Environment Journal 14, 219-234. 
European Commission 2013. European Commission Guidance for the Design of Renewables Support 
Schemes. Accompanying the Document Communication from the Commission. Delivering the 
Internal Market in Electricity and Making the Most of Public Intervention. Brussels. Document 
available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/com_2013_public_intervention_swd04_en.pdf>. 
Finon, D., Perez, Y. 2007. The social efficiency of instruments of promotion of renewable energies: A 
transaction-cost perspective. Ecological Economics 62, 77-92. 
Fischer, C., Preonas, L. 2010. Combining policies for renewable energy: Is the whole less than the 
sum of its parts?. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 4 (1), pp. 51-
92. 
Huber, C., et al. 2004. Action Plan for deriving dynamic RES-E policies. Report of the project Green-
X. Document available at 
<www.greenx.at/downloads/Action%20plan%20for%20deriving%20dynamic%20RESE%20polici
es%20-%20Green-X.pdf>. 
IEA 2011. Deploying renewables. Paris. 
IEA/IRENA 2013. Joint Policies and Measures Database. Available at 
<http://www.iea.org/policeandmeasures/renewableenergy>. 
Klessmann, C. Lovinfosse, I. 2012. Converging Support Schemes in Europe? Best Practice Design 
Criteria for Effective and Efficient Future RES-E Support. EREC-Ecofys Workshop-The Future of 
Renewable Electricity Support Schemes. Brussels. September 2012. Available at <www.iass-
potsdam.de/sites/default/files/files/ecofys_-_market_integration_of_renewable_energies_2013-03-
15.pdf>. 
Luderer, B. et al. 2002. Mathematical Formulas for Economists. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 
Mitchell, C., et al., 2011. Policy, Financing and Implementation. In IPCC Special Report on 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation [O. Edenhofer, O. et al. (eds)], 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Available at <http://srren.ipcc-
wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Ch11.pdf>. 
Müller, S. et al. 2011. Policy considerations for deploying renewables. International Energy Agency. 
Ragwitz, M., et al. 2007. OPTRES –Assessment and optimisation of renewable energy support 
schemes in the European electricity market-. Supported by the European Commission (D.G. 
Energy and Transport). Brussels. 
Ragwitz, M. et al. 2012. RE-Shaping: Shaping an Effective and Efficient European Renewable Energy 
Market. Final Report on the Intelligent Energy Europe Project Re-shaping. Available at 
<www.reshaping-res-policy.eu>. 
REN21 2005. Renewables 2005. Global Status Report. REN21. Geneve; 2005 Available at 
<www.ren21.net>. 
REN21 2009. Renewables. Global Status Report. Update 2009. REN21. Geneve; 2009 Available at 
<www.ren21.net>. 
Sijm, J. 2005. The Interaction between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and National Energy 
Policies. Climate Policy 5 (1), 79–96. 
15
 Sorrell, S. Sijm, J. 2003. Carbon trading in the policy mix. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19 (3), 
420-437. 
Teckenburg, E., et al. 2011. Renewable Energy Policy Country Profiles. Prepared within the 
Intelligent Energy Europe project. Contract no.: EIE/08/517/SI2.529243. Available at 
<www.reshaping-res-policy.eu>. 
Tinbergen, J. 1952. On the Theory of Economic Policy. North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Wrinkel et al. 2011. Renewable Energy Policy Country Profiles. Version 2011. EcoFys/Fraunhofer 
ISI/EEG/LEI. Available at <www.reshaping-res-policy.eu/downloads/RE-
Shaping_CP_final_18JAN2012.pdf>. 
Wiser, R. et al. 2011. Supporting solar power in renewables portfolio standards: Experience from the 
United States. Energy Policy, 39 (7), 3894-3905. 
 
*** 
16
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011 
 
2011/1, Oppedisano, V; Turati, G.: "What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time 
in Europe? Evidence from PISA" 
2011/2, Dahlberg, M; Edmark, K; Lundqvist, H.: "Ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution" 
2011/3, Canova, L.; Vaglio, A.: "Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
2011/4, Delgado, F.J.; Lago-Peñas, S.; Mayor, M.: “On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from 
Spain” 
2011/5, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: “A model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs” 
2011/6, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.; Parellada, M.: “Universities and regional economic growth in Spanish 
regions” 
2011/7, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.: “Do universities affect firms’ location decisions? Evidence from Spain” 
2011/8, Dahlberg, M.; Mörk, E.: “Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from 
election year effects” 
2011/9, Costas-Pérez, E.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Corruption scandals, press reporting, and 
accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors” 
2011/10, Choi, A.; Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: “Hell to touch the sky? Private tutoring and academic achievement 
in Korea” 
2011/11, Mira Godinho, M.; Cartaxo, R.: “University patenting, licensing and technology transfer: how 
organizational context and available resources determine performance” 
2011/12, Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: “The link between public support and private R&D 
effort: What is the optimal subsidy?” 
2011/13, Breuillé, M.L.; Duran-Vigneron, P.; Samson, A.L.: “To assemble to resemble? A study of tax disparities 
among French municipalities” 
2011/14, McCann, P.; Ortega-Argilés, R.: “Smart specialisation, regional growth and applications to EU cohesion 
policy” 
2011/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.: “Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications” 
2011/16, Pelegrín, A.; Bolancé, C.: “Offshoring and company characteristics: some evidence from the analysis of 
Spanish firm data” 
2011/17, Lin, C.: “Give me your wired and your highly skilled: measuring the impact of immigration policy on 
employers and shareholders”  
2011/18, Bianchini, L.; Revelli, F.: “Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity” 
2011/19, López Real, J.: “Family reunification or point-based immigration system? The case of the U.S. and 
Mexico” 
2011/20, Bogliacino, F.; Piva, M.; Vivarelli, M.: “The impact of R&D on employment in Europe: a firm-level 
analysis” 
2011/21, Tonello, M.: “Mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native students: rejection or 
integration?” 
2011/22, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Montolio, D.: “What type of innovative firms acquire knowledge 
intensive services and from which suppliers?” 
2011/23, Banal-Estañol, A.; Macho-Stadler, I.; Pérez-Castrillo, D.: “Research output from university-industry 
collaborative projects” 
2011/24, Ligthart, J.E.; Van Oudheusden, P.: “In government we trust: the role of fiscal decentralization” 
2011/25, Mongrain, S.; Wilson, J.D.: “Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility” 
2011/26, Caruso, R.; Costa, J.; Ricciuti, R.: “The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007” 
2011/27, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Local spending and the housing boom” 
2011/28, Simón, H.; Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.: “Occupational mobility of immigrants in a low skilled economy. The 
Spanish case” 
2011/29, Piolatto, A.; Trotin, G.: “Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory” 
2011/30, Montolio, D; Piolatto, A.: “Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns” 
2011/31, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Vivarelli, M.: “The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity” 
2011/32, Goodspeed, T.J.: “Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico” 
2011/33, Pedraja, F.; Cordero, J.M.: “Analysis of alternative proposals to reform the Spanish intergovernmental 
transfer system for municipalities” 
2011/34, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Welfare spending and ethnic 
heterogeneity: evidence from a massive immigration wave” 
2011/35, Lyytikäinen, T.: “Tax competition among local governments: evidence from a property tax reform in 
Finland” 
2011/36, Brülhart, M.; Schmidheiny, K.: “Estimating the Rivalness of State-Level Inward FDI” 
2011/37, García-Pérez, J.I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J.A.: “Does grade retention affect achievement? 
Some evidence from Pisa” 
2011/38, Boffa, f.; Panzar. J.: “Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative” 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011/39, González-Val, R.; Olmo, J.: “Growth in a cross-section of cities: location, increasing returns or random 
growth?” 
2011/40, Anesi, V.; De Donder, P.: “Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression” 
2011/41, Di Pietro, G.; Mora, T.: “The effect of the l’Aquila earthquake on labour market outcomes” 
2011/42, Brueckner, J.K.; Neumark, D.: “Beaches, sunshine, and public-sector pay: theory and evidence on 
amenities and rent extraction by government workers” 
2011/43, Cortés, D.: “Decentralization of government and contracting with the private sector” 
2011/44, Turati, G.; Montolio, D.; Piacenza, M.: “Fiscal decentralisation, private school funding, and students’ 
achievements. A tale from two Roman catholic countries” 
 
 
2012 
 
2012/1, Montolio, D.; Trujillo, E.: "What drives investment in telecommunications? The role of regulation, firms’ 
internationalization and market knowledge" 
2012/2, Giesen, K.; Suedekum, J.: "The size distribution across all “cities”: a unifying approach" 
2012/3, Foremny, D.; Riedel, N.: "Business taxes and the electoral cycle" 
2012/4, García-Estévez, J.; Duch-Brown, N.: "Student graduation: to what extent does university expenditure 
matter?" 
2012/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in 
tax enforcement" 
2012/6, Pickering, A.C.; Rockey, J.: "Ideology and the growth of US state government" 
2012/7, Vergolini, L.; Zanini, N.: "How does aid matter? The effect of financial aid on university enrolment 
decisions" 
2012/8, Backus, P.: "Gibrat’s law and legacy for non-profit organisations: a non-parametric analysis" 
2012/9, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "What underlies localization and 
urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms" 
2012/10, Mantovani, A.; Vandekerckhove, J.: "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in 
complementary markets" 
2012/11, Garcia-López, M.A.: "Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in Barcelona" 
2012/12, Revelli, F.: "Business taxation and economic performance in hierarchical government structures" 
2012/13, Arqué-Castells, P.; Mohnen, P.: "Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement 
effects" 
2012/14, Boffa, F.; Piolatto, A.; Ponzetto, G.: "Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the 
Clean Air Act" 
2012/15, Cheshire, P.C.; Hilber, C.A.L.; Kaplanis, I.: "Land use regulation and productivity – land matters: 
evidence from a UK supermarket chain" 
2012/16, Choi, A.; Calero, J.: "The contribution of the disabled to the attainment of the Europe 2020 strategy 
headline targets" 
2012/17, Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "The ins and outs of unemployment in a two-tier labor market" 
2012/18, González-Val, R.; Lanaspa, L.; Sanz, F.: "New evidence on Gibrat’s law for cities" 
2012/19, Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Job search methods in times of crisis: native and immigrant strategies in Spain" 
2012/20, Lessmann, C.: "Regional inequality and decentralization – an empirical analysis" 
2012/21, Nuevo-Chiquero, A.: "Trends in shotgun marriages: the pill, the will or the cost?" 
2012/22, Piil Damm, A.: "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random 
neighborhood assignment of immigrants" 
2012/23, Ploeckl, F.: "Space, settlements, towns: the influence of geography and market access on settlement 
distribution and urbanization" 
2012/24, Algan, Y.; Hémet, C.; Laitin, D.: "Diversity and local public goods: a natural experiment with exogenous 
residential allocation" 
2012/25, Martinez, D.; Sjögren, T.: "Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does 
unemployment make?" 
2012/26, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat" 
2012/27, Andini, M.; De Blasio, G.; Duranton, G.; Strange, W.C.: "Marshallian labor market pooling: evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/28, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?" 
2012/29, Buonanno, P.; Durante, R.; Prarolo, G.; Vanin, P.: "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the 
origins of the Sicilian mafia" 
2012/30, Anghel, B.; Cabrales, A.; Carro, J.M.: "Evaluating a bilingual education program in Spain: the impact 
beyond foreign language learning" 
2012/31, Curto-Grau, M.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers 
& state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2012/32, Kappeler, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Stephan, A.; Välilä, T.: "Does fiscal decentralization foster regional 
investment in productive infrastructure?" 
2012/33, Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: "Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/34, Ramachandran, R.: "Language use in education and primary schooling attainment: evidence from a 
natural experiment in Ethiopia" 
2012/35, Rothstein, J.: "Teacher quality policy when supply matters" 
2012/36, Ahlfeldt, G.M.: "The hidden dimensions of urbanity" 
2012/37, Mora, T.; Gil, J.; Sicras-Mainar, A.: "The influence of BMI, obesity and overweight on medical costs: a 
panel data approach" 
2012/38, Pelegrín, A.; García-Quevedo, J.: "Which firms are involved in foreign vertical integration?" 
2012/39, Agasisti, T.; Longobardi, S.: "Inequality in education: can Italian disadvantaged students close the gap? A 
focus on resilience in the Italian school system" 
 
 
2013 
 
2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age 
matter?" 
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 
2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas? 
The answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants" 
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 
2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans, 
the Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities" 
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated? 
Costs and benefits of being a capital/central municipality" 
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from 
Catalonia" 
2013/8, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Banking towards development: evidence from the Spanish 
banking expansion plan" 
2013/9, Asensio, J.; Gómez-Lobo, A.; Matas, A.: "How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? 
Evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain" 
2013/10, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions" 
2013/11, Segarra, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel, M.: "Financial constraints and the failure of innovation 
projects" 
2013/12, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.: "The mathematics skills of school children: How does England compare to the high 
performing East Asian jurisdictions?" 
2013/13, González-Val, R.; Tirado-Fabregat, D.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Market potential and city growth: 
Spain 1860-1960" 
2013/14, Lundqvist, H.: "Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office" 
2013/15, Ahlfeldt, G.M.; Maennig, W.: "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: a spatial analysis of airport effects" 
2013/16, Lampón, J.F.; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Factors behind international relocation and changes in production 
geography in the European automobile components industry" 
2013/17, Guío, J.M.; Choi, A.: "Evolution of the school failure risk during the 2000 decade in Spain: analysis of 
Pisa results with a two-level logistic mode" 
2013/18, Dahlby, B.; Rodden, J.: "A political economy model of the vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal 
imbalances in a federation" 
2013/19, Acacia, F.; Cubel, M.: "Strategic voting and happiness" 
2013/20, Hellerstein, J.K.; Kutzbach, M.J.; Neumark, D.: "Do labor market networks have an important spatial 
dimension?" 
2013/21, Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand constraints to 
innovation" 
2013/22, Lin, J.: "Regional resilience" 
2013/23, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: "R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation in 
the energy industry" 
2013/24, Huisman, R.; Stradnic, V.; Westgaard, S.: "Renewable energy and electricity prices: indirect empirical 
evidence from hydro power" 
2013/25, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/26, Lambertini, L.; Mantovani, A.: "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-
emption, voracity and exhaustion" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2013/27, Feld, L.P.; Kalb, A.; Moessinger, M.D.; Osterloh, S.: "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules 
and no-bailout clauses – the Swiss experience" 
2013/28, Hilber, C.A.L.; Vermeulen, W.: "The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England" 
2013/29, Revelli, F.: "Tax limits and local democracy" 
2013/30, Wang, R.; Wang, W.: "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization" 
2013/31, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/32, Saarimaa, T.; Tukiainen, J.: "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary 
reforms" 
2013/33, Agasisti, T.; Murtinu, S.: "Are we wasting public money? No! The effects of grants on Italian university 
students’ performances" 
2013/34, Flacher, D.; Harari-Kermadec, H.; Moulin, L.: "Financing higher education: a contributory scheme" 
2013/35, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: "Sending the pork home: birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities" 
2013/36, Coad, A.; Frankish, J.S.; Roberts, R.G.; Storey, D.J.: "New venture survival and growth: Does the fog 
lift?" 
2013/37, Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Waterson, M.: "Revenues from storage in a competitive electricity market: 
Empirical evidence from Great Britain" 
 
 
2014 
 
2014/1, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "When police patrols matter. The effect of police proximity on citizens’ 
crime risk perception" 
2014/2, Garcia-López, M.A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do land use policies follow road 
construction?" 
2014/3, Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: "Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle" 
2014/4, Cuberes, D.; González-Val, R.: "The effect of the Spanish Reconquest on Iberian Cities" 
2014/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, E.: "Tax professionals' view of the Spanish tax system: efficiency, 
equity and tax planning" 
2014/6, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Difference-form group contests" 
2014/7, Del Rey, E.; Racionero, M.: "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-
pooling" 
2014/8, Torregrosa Hetland, S.: "A fiscal revolution? Progressivity in the Spanish tax system, 1960-1990" 
2014/9, Piolatto, A.: "Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion" 
2014/10, Costa, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Segarra, A.: "Energy efficiency determinants: an empirical analysis of 
Spanish innovative firms" 
2014/11, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Reviving demand-pull perspectives: the effect of 
demand uncertainty and stagnancy on R&D strategy" 
2014/12, Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Barriers to non-formal professional training in Spain in periods of economic 
growth and crisis. An analysis with special attention to the effect of the previous human capital of workers" 
2014/13, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty" 
2014/14, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: "Media competition and electoral politics" 
2014/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Regulatory environment and firm performance in EU 
telecommunications services" 
2014/16, Lopez-Rodriguez, J.; Martinez, D.: "Beyond the R&D effects on innovation: the contribution of non-
R&D activities to TFP growth in the EU" 
2014/17, González-Val, R.: "Cross-sectional growth in US cities from 1990 to 2000" 
2014/18, Vona, F.; Nicolli, F.: "Energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in OECD countries" 
2014/19, Curto-Grau, M.: "Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies" 
2014/20, Duro, J.A.; Teixidó-Figueras, J.; Padilla, E.: "The causal factors of international inequality in co2 
emissions per capita: a regression-based inequality decomposition analysis" 
2014/21, Fleten, S.E.; Huisman, R.; Kilic, M.; Pennings, E.; Westgaard, S.: "Electricity futures prices: time 
varying sensitivity to fundamentals" 
2014/22, Afcha, S.; García-Quevedo, J,: "The impact of R&D subsidies on R&D employment composition" 
 

